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INTRODUCTION 
The United States’ military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
been heavily dependent on civilian contractors.1  The reliance on 
personnel not under the direct control and management of the 
United States military2 and the presence of contractors in foreign 
battle zones raise significant questions about how military contractors 
can be held responsible for their actions abroad.  Abuses perpetrated 
by military contractors abroad are exemplified by several contractors’ 
participation—or complicity—in the torture and abuse of Iraqi 
detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison and other locations in Iraq.3 
In September of 2011, a panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided two related cases addressing 
the ability of federal courts to review U.S. government contractors’ 
misbehavior in war zones.  Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc.4 and Al 
Shimari v. CACI International, Inc.5 directly addressed the ability of 
foreign citizens to sue government contractors for their actions 
abroad.6  The panel reached two conclusions in these cases.  First, the 
court held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral 
order doctrine.7  Second, it held that state tort actions against military 
                                                          
 1. See T. Christian Miller, Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 
2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/04/nation/na-private4 (noting that 
about 180,000 civilian contractors were working in Iraq in 2007, including 21,000 
Americans, 118,000 Iraqis, and 43,000 from other countries). 
 2. Id.; see also Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 415–16 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining the role of contractors in interrogations in Iraq and detailing the 
military procedures applicable to all personnel involved in military detentions, 
including contractors), vacated, No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 
2012) (en banc). 
 3. See CACI, 658 F.3d at 414–16 (recounting that a shortage of military 
personnel led the U.S. government to contract with private corporations to conduct 
interrogations in Iraq, including at Abu Ghraib prison, where some contractors 
allegedly conspired to commit and cover up torture); Diane Marie Amann, Abu 
Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2085 (2005) (situating images of the torture at Abu 
Ghraib in the context of government denials that no United States actors ever 
engaged in torture). 
 4. 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 
No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 5. 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th 
Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 6. Both cases involved suits by Iraqi citizens who claimed to have been held and 
tortured by the United States military with the aid of government contractors.  L-3 
Servs., 657 F.3d at 202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 414–15. 
 7. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 203–05. 
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contractors are preempted by important federal interests.8  Rehearing 
the cases en banc, the Fourth Circuit dismissed both appeals, holding 
that the collateral order doctrine did not confer appellate 
jurisdiction.9  This Note will argue that the Fourth Circuit panel 
decisions missed an opportunity to clarify the precise nature of the 
defense available to military contractors and failed to determine 
whether contractors can be held liable at all for their actions 
overseas.  The en banc decision correctly clarified that contractor 
defenses do not rise to the level of immunity from suit, but it did not 
further define the nature of contractor defenses.10   
Part I of this Note will present the facts and holdings of L-3 Services 
and CACI and briefly describe the underlying law.  Part II will critique 
the panel’s holdings, argue that the panel conflated the doctrines of 
sovereign immunity and federal preemption, and detail the 
procedural and practical consequences of the panel’s conflation.  
Part II will then conclude that preemption analysis is the most 
appropriate approach to both protecting the federal interests 
inherent in military actions abroad and the ability of foreign citizens 
to hold military contractors accountable for their actions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Cases:  Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc. and Al Shimari v. CACI 
International, Inc. 
Both L-3 Services and CACI were suits filed by Iraqi citizens against 
American military contractors.11  The plaintiffs in both cases claimed 
that they were detained by the United States military in Iraq.12  The 
United States government had hired contractors to provide 
interrogation and translation services at military detention sites.13  
While the Fourth Circuit panel noted in CACI that the contractors 
were required to comply with U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
interrogation policies and practices,14 the plaintiffs in both L-3 Services 
                                                          
 8. CACI, 658 F.3d at 417. 
 9. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773, at *13 (4th Cir. 
May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 10. See id. at *3 (declining to express an “opinion as to the merits of any 
immunity” asserted by CACI and also declining to draw a distinction between 
derivative sovereign immunity and derivative absolute official immunity); see also infra 
Part II.A (arguing that the Fourth Circuit conflated two different defenses potentially 
available to military contractors and identifying the procedural incongruity that 
results from this conflation). 
 11. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 414. 
 12. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 414. 
 13. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 414. 
 14. CACI, 658 F.3d at 415. 
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and CACI asserted that their detentions in Abu Ghraib and other 
facilities involved dangerous stress positions; beatings; assaults; 
sensory deprivation; food, water, and sleep deprivation; and other 
abuses that were in direct contravention of DOD policies.15  Despite 
the factual similarities between these cases, the panel addressed two 
different legal questions. 
1. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc. and the court’s appellate  jurisdiction 
over appeal from a denied motion to dismiss 
In L-3 Services, the Fourth Circuit panel addressed whether it had 
appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.16  Seventy-two Iraqis initiated the 
litigation in L-3 Services after being detained by the United States in 
Iraq.17  The plaintiffs alleged that federal government contractors 
tortured them and other detainees rather than simply providing 
translation services during interrogations.18 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on “numerous 
grounds,”19 which the district court denied.20  The Fourth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s denial and remanded the case with 
instructions to dismiss the litigation.21  While the Fourth Circuit cited 
CACI to justify its substantive holding regarding federal preemption, 
its decision in L-3 Services provided the reasoning for asserting 
appellate jurisdiction in both cases.22 
Though the Fourth Circuit panel acknowledged that its appellate 
jurisdiction is generally limited to final district court decisions,23 the 
panel held that the appeal was justified under the “collateral order 
doctrine” for several reasons.24  First, the court asserted that the 
questions of immunity, separation of powers, and federal preemption 
raised by the appeal could not be revisited upon a final district court 
decision.25  Second, the court reasoned that the “battlefield 
                                                          
 15. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 416. 
 16. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 203. 
 17. Id. at 202. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 202–03 (identifying the political question doctrine, law of war 
immunity, federal preemption, and derivative absolute immunity as the grounds 
asserted for dismissal). 
 20. Id. at 203. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 203–05 (holding that a district court’s denial of a sovereign immunity-
based motion to dismiss was immediately appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine because allowing the case to proceed would require judicial scrutiny of 
military policies, which immunity precludes). 
 23. Id. at 204. 
 24. Id. at 204–05; see infra Part I.B (defining the collateral order doctrine). 
 25. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 205. 
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preemption” asserted by the defendants was equivalent to immunity 
and, therefore, must be addressed before trial to preserve the 
defense.26  Third, the court approached the questions of federal 
preemption and immunity as distinct from the merits of the 
litigation.27  Finally, the court identified a “strong public policy” 
rationale for preventing actions taken in foreign war zones from 
being scrutinized and litigated in civil courts.28 
2. Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc. and possible defenses against 
 tort liability for contractors acting abroad 
The CACI litigation was commenced by four Iraqi citizens who had 
been detained by the United States military in Abu Ghraib prison.29  
Like the litigation in L-3 Services, CACI involved contractors who were 
retained by the military to provide interrogation and intelligence 
collection services.30  The plaintiffs alleged that the contractors 
participated in a conspiracy to torture the prisoners.31  The district 
court denied the contractor’s motion to dismiss.32 
In CACI, the Fourth Circuit panel examined the substantive law 
regarding the military contractors’ liability in federal court.33  The 
court determined that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ claims of 
torture and abuse.34  The court reasoned that because the contractors 
acted on behalf of the United States, important federal interests were 
implicated by the litigation.35  In particular, the court noted that civil 
actions would place a burden on military personnel,36 and potential 
liability would impact the availability and cost of services required by 
the military.37  The court determined that these interests were 
                                                          
 26. Id.  The court later defined “battlefield preemption” as “complete eradication of 
the ‘imposition per se’ of tort law, that is the complete removal of even the possibility 
of suit from the battlefield.”  Id. at 206 (citing Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 7 
(D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011)). 
 27. Id. at 205. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 
10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 414–15; see also id. at 416 (“While some of the abuses that the plaintiffs 
detailed in the allegations of their complaint appear to have been approved by the 
military . . . others were clearly not.”). 
 32. Id. at 415.  Like the motion to dismiss in L-3 Services, the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss relied on the political question doctrine, derivative sovereign immunity, 
and federal preemption.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 417–19. 
 36. Id. at 418. 
 37. Id. 
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sufficiently weighty to justify preempting the plaintiffs’ state tort 
actions.38 
 Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit dismissed both L-3 Services and 
CACI.39  The Court rejected the panel’s reasoning that the circuit 
court’s denial of the contractors’ motion to dismiss was a final 
decision permitting appellate jurisdiction.40 
B. The Collateral Order Doctrine and Appellate Jurisdiction 
The litigation in L-3 Services and CACI first arrived in the Fourth 
Circuit on appeal from the district court denials of the defendants’ 
motions to dismiss.41  A denial of a motion to dismiss is generally 
insufficient to grant appellate jurisdiction to federal courts of 
appeals.42  The “collateral order doctrine,” however, allows appellate 
jurisdiction over non-final judgments in certain circumstances.43  This 
expansion of appellate jurisdiction beyond the strict boundaries of 
the final order requirement is premised on the contention that non-
final orders, including denials of motions to dismiss, may be of 
sufficient importance to merit review before litigation is terminated.44 
For example, cases implicating a right to avoid trial, such as 
immunity or violation of the double jeopardy prohibition, cannot be 
adequately reviewed after trial because the right to avoid trial has 
already been violated and cannot be remedied later.45  Courts can, 
therefore, review a non-final order if the order “[1] conclusively 
determine[s] the disputed question, [2] resolve[s] an important issue 
                                                          
 38. Id. at 417. 
 39. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773, at *13 (4th Cir. 
May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 202–03 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated 
sub nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 
11, 2012) (en banc); CACI, 658 F.3d at 416. 
 42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction 
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658–59 (1977) 
(noting that only a “small class of cases” are not subject to the final-judgment rule 
and holding that a pretrial order to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy 
grounds is one such case). 
 43. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–46 (1949) 
(recognizing appellate jurisdiction from non-final orders, but limiting the availability 
of such appeals to rights that are “separable from” the rights asserted in the litigation 
and significant enough to require a review that might not be possible after a final 
judgment). 
 44. See, e.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350–53 (2006) (holding that, in the 
pretrial order context, the collateral order doctrine does not apply to the “mere 
avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public 
interest,” such as separation of powers, government efficiency, respecting a state’s 
dignitary interests, and mitigating the government’s advantage over an individual). 
 45. Id. at 350–51. 
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completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [is] 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”46  Because 
the collateral order doctrine allows appellate jurisdiction in limited 
circumstances, the grounds for appeal will determine whether an 
appeal is available. 
C. Defenses Available for Contractors Sued Under State Tort Law 
In asserting a defense for private action, government contractors 
primarily argue that a contractual relationship with the government 
entitles the contractor to similar protections in litigation as those 
granted to the government.47  Generally, courts have extended 
defenses to government contractors based on a theory of either 
derivative sovereign immunity or federal preemption of state tort 
actions.48 
1. Derivative sovereign immunity 
The government enjoys an absolute immunity from litigation.49  
Though government actions can be challenged through suits against 
government officers,50 contractors often argue that their contractual 
                                                          
 46. Id. at 350 (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 
U.S. 139, 144 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988) (considering a 
contractor defense based on the incompatibility of the state-imposed standard of 
care and the specifications for production established in the government contract); 
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that contractor 
defendants were not subject to state tort law for actions taken during a military 
contract in Iraq), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011).  See generally George E. Hurley, 
Jr., Government Contractor Liability in Military Design Defect Cases:  The Need for Judicial 
Intervention, 117 MIL. L. REV. 219 (1987) (reviewing cases involving military 
contractors’ product liability before Boyle was decided by the Supreme Court); Aaron 
L. Jackson, Civilian Soldiers:  Expanding the Government Contractor Defense to Reflect the 
New Corporate Role in Warfare, 63 A.F. L. REV. 211 (2009) (arguing that existing 
precedent focused on product manufacturing liability should be extended to reflect 
the role of government contractors in providing military services). 
 48. See generally Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power:  How Privatizing Military Efforts 
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005) 
(examining the use of private contractors in different areas of government and the 
apparent lack of accountability for contractors’ actions); Larry J. Gusman, Note, 
Rethinking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. Government Contractor Defense:  Judicial 
Preemption of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 391 (1990) 
(considering Boyle as a hybrid of several different theories of government immunity 
and arguing against the creation of a “Contractor Defense”). 
 49. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882) (reasoning that sovereign 
power and interests would be significantly harmed if private citizens were constantly 
able to litigate against the federal government); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 264, 411–12 (1821) (“The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be 
commenced or prosecuted against the United States . . . .”). 
 50. See Lee, 106 U.S. at 205 (rejecting the argument that officers, as agents of the 
United States, are entitled to sovereign immunity). 
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relationship with the government entitles them to derivative 
sovereign immunity.51 
Where contractor activities are integrated with a government 
function, the government’s sovereign immunity can be extended to 
cover the contractor.  In Mangold v. Analytic Services, Inc.,52 the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that a government contractor would not be liable 
for statements made to a government official during an official 
investigation.53  The court reasoned that immunity was recognized as 
a means of protecting government functions.54  Thus “[i]f absolute 
immunity protects a particular governmental function . . . it is a small 
step to protect that function when delegated to private contractors.”55 
The federal government can, however, waive sovereign immunity 
and subject itself to liability.56  The most significant example of this 
waiver is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).57  The FTCA permits 
tort litigation against the government,58 but it contains several 
exceptions that preserve sovereign immunity against certain types of 
suits.59 
2. Federal preemption of state tort claims 
Rather than extend sovereign immunity to contractors, some 
courts have simply precluded state tort actions by finding the state 
laws are preempted by federal interests.60  The Supremacy Clause of 
                                                          
 51. See Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1447 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(defining the applicability of sovereign immunity by the governmental function, 
rather than the identity of the party performing that function, and holding that “the 
public interest may demand that immunity protect [government contractors] to the 
same extent that it protects government employees”). 
 52. 77 F.3d 1442 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 53. Id. at 1449. 
 54. Id. at 1448. 
 55. Id. at 1447–48. 
 56. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) (authorizing original 
jurisdiction in federal courts for suits in state tort law listing the United States as a 
defendant, with certain exceptions); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(“The United States is protected from unconsented suit under the ancient common 
law doctrine of sovereign immunity.” (emphasis added)). 
 57. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
 58. Id. § 1346(b)(1). 
 59. Id. § 2680.  Contractors can be deemed federal employees but only if the 
federal government controls detailed physical aspects of their work.  See United 
States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 808 (1976) (noting that receiving federal money or 
being subject to federal regulations is irrelevant to whether contractors qualify as 
federal employees); Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 530 (1973) (finding that 
prison workers employed pursuant to a contract with the federal government were 
not federal government employees because the government had no role in physically 
supervising the employees). 
 60. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (noting that 
federal statutes or common law replace state law where “uniquely federal interests . . . 
are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control 
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the U.S. Constitution mandates that all federal laws are the “supreme 
Law of the Land.”61  State laws, such as tort law, are, therefore, 
preempted where they conflict with federal laws.62 
When the Supreme Court previously considered liability for 
military contractors, it held that important federal interests could 
preempt state tort actions.  In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,63 the 
Court held that the federal government’s important interest in 
military operations preempted a state wrongful death claim by the 
family of a helicopter pilot.64  The Court in Boyle reasoned that the 
duty of care imposed by state tort law significantly interfered with the 
contractor’s duty to follow the terms and specifications of its contract 
with the federal government.65  Thus, the Court recognized that 
federal interests could preempt state law even where no conflicting 
federal law existed.66  In Saleh v. Titan Corp.,67 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit extended the Boyle 
preemption to include military contractors in Iraq.68 
In both of these cases, the courts defined the bounds of federal 
preemption using specific exceptions to the FTCA.  In Boyle, the 
Court relied on the FTCA exception for government officials 
exercising their legal discretion.69  In Saleh, the court extended Boyle 
to include the “combatant activities” exception to the FTCA.70  
                                                          
that state law is preempted”). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 62. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507–08 (detailing the circumstances in which the 
conflict between federal interests and state laws will require that the state law be 
displaced by federal law). 
 63. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
 64. Id. at 502, 511–12. 
 65. Id. at 509. 
 66. See id. at 512 (explaining that a government contractor will not be liable 
under state tort law where the government provides specifications, the contractor 
conforms to those specifications, and the contractor warns the government about 
potential dangers). 
 67. 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011). 
 68. Id. at 5.  The logic of extending Boyle to military contractors in Iraq is beyond 
the scope of this Note.  This Note will not address the extension of Boyle in Saleh, but 
it will assume that Saleh represents the current state of the law and that some form of 
federal law will protect military contractors in Iraq. 
 69. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509, 511 (identifying the FTCA as an appropriate 
“limiting principle” for the bounds of federal interest that would require preempting 
state tort law).  The decision in Boyle explicitly rejected the reasoning of the lower 
court, which relied on Supreme Court precedent prohibiting tort claims by members 
of the military.  See id. at 509–10 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)) 
(determining that only the FTCA avoids contractor preemption that is overly broad 
or overly narrow).  See generally, Paul Figley, In Defense of Feres:  An Unfairly Maligned 
Opinion, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 394 (2010) (detailing the evolution and utility of the Feres 
doctrine). 
 70. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6 (describing the combatant activities exception to the 
FTCA as the most appropriate standard to measure the extent of federal preemption 
in cases involving military contractors’ actions abroad); see also, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) 
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Because these cases preclude tort action against government 
contractors on the basis of preemption, the decisions do not actually 
extend sovereign immunity to contractors.  Rather, the two decisions 
overlay preemption precedent with the FTCA’s sovereign immunity 
framework.71 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Conflation of Preemption and Immunity Defenses 
The Fourth Circuit panel opinions in L-3 Services and CACI purport 
to address two different, but interrelated, issues.  First, the opinion in 
L-3 Services defended the court’s ability to render a decision by 
holding that the Fourth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the 
denial of a motion to dismiss.72  Second, the court in CACI held that 
federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ claims against several military 
contractors.73  
A court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal from denial of a motion to 
dismiss is contingent on the contractors asserting an immunity 
defense.74  The panel in CACI held explicitly that important federal 
interests preempted the tort claims asserted by the Iraqi plaintiffs.75  
The panel in L-3 Services, however, justified the court’s appellate 
jurisdiction by citing prior Supreme Court decisions applying the 
collateral order doctrine to immunity assertions.76  Additionally, the 
panel in L-3 Services described the goal of federal preemption as “the 
complete removal of even the possibility of suit from the battlefield.”77 
The basis of the panel’s opinion in L-3 Services indicates that it 
utilized more of an immunity rationale rather than a preemption 
                                                          
(2006) (reserving federal sovereign immunity against claims arising out of 
“combatant activities”). 
 71. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (using the exceptions to the FTCA as a proxy statute 
to identify federal interests that may conflict with state tort law); Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6 
(applying a different FTCA exception that fit the fact pattern before the court). 
 72. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated sub 
nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 
2012) (en banc). 
 73. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 
10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 74. See supra Part I.B (describing the collateral order doctrine).  Immunity is not 
the only defense that would allow appeal under the collateral order doctrine, but 
preemption likely would not succeed.  See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 
489 U.S. 794, 801 (1989) (distinguishing between true rights not to stand trial 
(immunity) and substantive law that could result in termination or dismissal of the 
litigation (preemption)). 
 75. CACI, 658 F.3d at 420. 
 76. L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 204–05. 
 77. Id. at 206. 
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rationale.  Preemption analysis determines whether state law can 
apply.78  Immunity, on the other hand, determines whether any law 
will apply.79  The panel’s reliance on immunity analysis in L-3 Services 
and its assertion that “preemption” is necessary to keep battlefield 
conduct out of the courts indicates that the Fourth Circuit meant to 
remove military contractor conduct from courts entirely.80  This is a 
different aim than simply displacing state law in deference to federal 
interests.81  While preemption analysis determines whether state or 
federal substantive law governs a situation—or, more precisely, 
whether state law can apply—the panel’s reasoning in L-3 Services 
reflects a desire to remove these contractor suits from the courts 
entirely.82 
B. Contradictory Holdings in L-3 Services and CACI 
The Fourth Circuit panel’s conflation of preemption and immunity 
defenses led to contradictory holdings in L-3 Services and CACI.  As 
the dissent in L-3 Services argued, designating an immunity or 
preemption defense is central to determining whether the Fourth 
Circuit had jurisdiction to review these cases before the district court 
reached a final decision on the merits.83  The Fourth Circuit’s 
decisions were contradictory because the court relied on an immunity 
defense for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction84 but relied on 
the federal preemption doctrine to hold that the contractors’ 
motions to dismiss should have been granted.85 
                                                          
 78. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1988) (explaining 
that state law can only be “displaced”). 
 79. See id. at 504–12 (distinguishing between the preemption of state tort claims 
against government contractors necessary to protect federal interests and the 
absolute immunity preventing any claims at all against the federal government). 
 80. See L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 204–06 (“Just as immunity from suit must be 
recognized in the early stages of litigation in order to have its full effect, battlefield 
preemption must also be recognized in order to prevent judicial scrutiny of an active 
military zone.”). 
 81. See id. at 209 (King, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between immunity—the 
right not to stand trial—and preemption—the displacement of state tort actions by 
federal interests). 
 82. See id. at 203–06 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that federal preemption 
represents a strong public policy interest during wartime “to free military 
commanders from the doubts and uncertainty inherent in potential subjection to 
civil suit” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 83. See id. at 206 (King, J., dissenting) (asserting that immunity and preemption 
are different doctrines and should not be conflated for the purposes of determining 
jurisdiction to preserve the narrowness of the collateral order doctrine). 
 84. Id. at 204–05 (majority opinion) (citing cases involving presidential absolute 
immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, qualified immunity, and double 
jeopardy as support for finding appellate jurisdiction in a case involving federal 
preemption). 
 85. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e 
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By declaring that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ state tort 
claims, the Fourth Circuit eviscerated its immunity-based 
jurisdiction.86  By basing its jurisdiction on an immunity defense, but 
reasoning that the case should be dismissed due to federal 
preemption, the Fourth Circuit panel confused the two doctrines and 
missed an opportunity to clarify the nature of the protection enjoyed 
by military contractors. 
The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision resolved the contradiction 
between the two panel decisions on jurisdictional grounds, but left 
open the question as to the exact nature and extent of the defenses 
available to government contractors.87  By dismissing the appeals, the 
majority both clarified that the defenses asserted by the contractors in 
L-3 Services and CACI are not tantamount to immunity from suit and 
avoided deciding the merits of those defenses.88  While the en banc 
decision begins to clarify the nature of a contractor defense, further 
development is necessary. 
C. The Importance of Maintaining the Distinction Between Preemption and 
Immunity 
Though the distinction between immunity and preemption 
defenses had only procedural consequences in L-3 Services and CACI,89 
the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision, which ameliorated the panel’s 
confusion of these two doctrines, helps to resolve the current 
ambiguity surrounding the status of government contractors 
generally and of military contractors specifically.90  While preemption 
is simply the removal of state tort law as the substantive standard 
                                                          
conclude . . . that the plaintiffs’ tort claims are preempted . . . .”), vacated, No. 10-
1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 86. See L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 209 (King, J., dissenting) (reasoning that 
preemption under Saleh could be effectively reviewed after a trial in the district court 
and arguing that allowing immediate appeal in L-3 Services and CACI overextended 
the reach of the collateral order doctrine); see also Martin v. Halliburton, 618 F.3d 
476, 486 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that a claim of federal preemption based on the 
combatant activities exception to the FTCA is not immediately appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine). 
 87. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773, at *13 (4th Cir. 
May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 88. Id. at *8, 13 (“Saleh preemption falls squarely on the side of being a defense 
to liability and not an immunity from suit”). 
 89. See Steve Vladeck, Immunity vs. Preemption in the Fourth Circuit Torture Cases—
And Why That Distinction Matters, LAWFARE (Dec. 20, 2011, 12:16 PM), 
www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/immunity-vs-preemption (identifying the 
jurisdictional element as the most likely grounds for the panel decision to be 
overturned). 
 90. Jackson, supra note 47, at 219 (assuming that the Boyle Court’s examination of 
the FTCA represented an extension of immunity to government contractors). 
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governing a defendant’s behavior, immunity provides protection 
against all future lawsuits.91 
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged in L-3 Services and CACI that 
military contractors can cause significant harm to foreign civilians.92  
In contrast, the court in Saleh indicated that military contractors 
enjoy some kind of protection from litigation.93  A grant of immunity 
precludes all future suits against military contractors who commit 
abuses in foreign war zones, while recognition of federal preemption 
of state tort law claims under Boyle precludes only state tort actions.94 
D. Preemption Is the Appropriate Understanding of a Government 
Contractor Defense 
As the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision seems to indicate, federal 
preemption is the more appropriate characterization of the defenses 
available to government contractors acting in military operations 
because such defenses preclude only state tort actions and does not 
completely remove military contractors from court.  The Court in 
Boyle emphasized that important governmental interests in the 
manufacturing of military equipment would be jeopardized by 
allowing a contractor to be liable under state product liability 
doctrine.95  The Fourth Circuit panel identified several similarly 
important federal interests in L-3 Services and CACI:  the ability to 
interrogate detainees in foreign battlefields; the ability of military 
commanders to complete their assignments without being “haled 
into [civilian] courts” to provide testimony; and the ability to conduct 
military campaigns without the interference of litigation.96  The 
                                                          
 91. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (waiving federal sovereign immunity for certain 
civil actions by granting district courts “original jurisdiction” over suits naming the 
United States as a defendant); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 
(1988) (characterizing the federal preemption recognized in the case for privately 
produced military equipment as “displacement”). 
 92. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 418–19 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(accepting as true the plaintiffs’ allegations of torture, abuse, and injury), vacated, 
No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc). 
 93. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that military 
contractors were not liable under District of Columbia tort law, but blending 
discussions of federal preemption and sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
3055 (2011). 
 94. The preclusion of state tort claims is significant.  However, federal 
preemption leaves open the possibility that other causes of action may be available as 
recourse against military contractors.  Immunity removes military contractors from 
the jurisdiction of federal courts altogether.  See supra notes 75–78 and 
accompanying text (referring to the fact that federal preemption implicates only the 
displacement of state tort claims). 
 95. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509 (noting that the requirements of the defendant’s 
military contract and the state duty of care were mutually exclusive). 
 96. See Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating an 
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concern for costs to the government in CACI mirrors a concern in 
Boyle that any costs of contractor liability would simply be passed onto 
the federal government in the next contract—thus defeating the 
purpose of sovereign immunity.97 
The court’s justifications for preemption may represent legitimate 
concerns that validate the displacement of state tort law.  If the 
decision in Saleh represents the current understanding of the law 
governing suits against military contractors,98 it is likely that those 
actions will be subject to some limitation.  The question, therefore, is 
whether that limitation is based on immunity or preemption.99  The 
uniquely federal interests of foreign military actions likely justify 
preemption.100  Immunity, however, is inappropriate in cases alleging 
torture by military contractors.  Immunity, the right to avoid trial, 
would preclude all actions against military contractors, even where 
the contractors are not performing a governmental function that 
would require extending sovereign immunity.101  Additionally, while 
state tort law preemption precludes further litigation of L-3 Services 
and CACI, it does not preclude other suits that might render military 
contractors liable for their actions.102 
                                                          
unwillingness to risk subjecting military personnel to improper court appearances or 
depositions), vacated sub nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 
1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc); CACI, 658 F.3d at 418–19 (citing Saleh, 
580 F.3d at 7 (coining the term “battlefield preemption”)). 
 97. See CACI, 658 F.3d at 418 (analogizing the cost and availability of contract 
workers to the increased cost of manufactured goods resulting from contractors 
compensating for their tort liability by increasing charges to the government). 
 98. The facts in Saleh were identical to the facts in L-3 Services and CACI.  Compare 
CACI, 658 F.3d at 414 (suit against United States military contractors by Iraqi citizens 
detained in Iraq), with Saleh, 580 F.3d at 2 (suit against United States military 
contractors by Iraqi citizens detained at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq).  See also supra 
note 65, which identifies the correctness of the Saleh decision as beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
 99. The defendants in L-3 Services and CACI based their motions to dismiss on 
several other grounds, such as the political question doctrine.  L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 
202; CACI, 658 F.3d at 415. However, the Fourth Circuit focused primarily on the 
questions of derivative sovereign immunity and preemption.  L-3 Servs., 657 F.3d at 
203; CACI, 658 F.3d at 415.  This Note, therefore, focuses only on these two options 
as well. 
 100. See supra notes 95–97 (agreeing that the federal interests at stake in litigation 
involving military contractors may be sufficient to require preemption of state law). 
 101. See CACI, 658 F.3d at 416 (acknowledging that some incidents of torture and 
abuse went beyond the authorized actions outlined in military guidelines).  Contra 
Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1447 (4th Cir. 1996) (indicating that 
participation in a governmental investigation is sufficiently integrated with a 
government function to justify extending sovereign immunity to a government 
contractor). 
 102. Displacement of state law does not, for instance, preclude actions under 
federal law; federal law or “federal interests” form the basis for displacement under 
the Supremacy Clause.  See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) 
(analyzing the clearly identifiable federal law or interests that would justify 
displacement of a state tort action). 
JOHNSON.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:15 PM 
2012] SHIELDS OF WAR 1431 
CONCLUSION 
The L-3 Services and CACI cases presented several challenges for 
federal court jurisprudence:  the application of the doctrines of 
collateral order jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and federal 
preemption to military contractors’ actions overseas.  Because Boyle 
and Saleh indicate that some type of defense will be available for 
military contractors, the primary question presented by these cases is 
the form the defense will take.  While the Fourth Circuit panel 
opinions in L-3 Services and CACI appeared to conflate immunity and 
preemption, the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision correctly resolved 
the collateral order doctrine question in favor of a preemption-like 
analysis that does not grant contractors an automatic right to avoid 
trial entirely.  The facts of L-3 Services and CACI indicate that military 
contractors can do significant harm to civilians, either through 
authorized interrogation or by unauthorized torture.  While an 
immunity defense precludes any legal liability for military contractors, 
preemption of certain state tort suits preserves the possibility that 
other federal actions would remain available.  The two doctrines are 
intertwined as a result of the federal interests at stake in military 
contractor litigation.  Clear boundaries between immunity and 
preemption must be maintained, however, to ensure that 
government contractors are held accountable for damages caused by 
their inappropriate actions in war zones. 
